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ABSTRACT:  
The Supreme Court regularly reviews agency interpretations of statutes. For many years, 
the official dogma of the Court was one of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes – the so-called “Chevron doctrine.” After Mead and Christensen, the Court 
was open to other levels of respect for agency interpretations. Recently, cases have so 
emphasized the particular statutory construction methods of the individual justices that the 
agency interpretation of a statute is now on the level of legislative history or other aids to 
interpretation, such as canons, which may or may not be used at a justice’s option. The array of 
treatments of the agency interpretation - no deference, Chevron or Skidmore deference, or even 
no mention at all - makes it easier to impose judicial views that bind or will not bind in the future 
as a judicial declaration of “what the law is” under Marbury v. Madison.  Agency interpretation 
is no longer the preferred method to resolve ambiguity in a statute.
This article traces this development by first examining what the Christensen and Mead
cases theoretically did. Part III examines the status of deference to agency decisions in practice 
in the Supreme Court in the last two years, namely 2003 and 2004.  In Part IV, the article places 
the debate in the context of the two theories of judicial discretion and statutory interpretation. 
Part V concludes that agency interpretation has become analogous to a mere canon of 
construction. 
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“On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing legislative acts, no 
difference of opinion can exist. It is only in the application of those principles that the 
difference discovers itself.” 
- United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386,  2 L.Ed.. 304 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)
I. Introduction
As early as 1805, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that certain “abstract principles” 
about statutory construction appear universal, but that the “difference discovers itself” only when 
the principles are applied.1 This remains true in the Supreme Court two hundred years later; 
however, there is also some stark disagreement about some of the abstract principles themselves. 
Nothing provides a better prism on this divergence than how the Court treats agency 
interpretation of statutes. At one point,  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
1
 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386, 2 L.Ed.. 304 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). 
Dueling Fisher quotes are discussed, infra, at 
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Council, Inc.2  seemed to govern firmly at least the principles of the agency-court relationship. 
Pursuant to its so-called “two-step,” if a court first determined that Congress had not clearly 
spoken on the matter, a court must defer to the agency interpretation if the court deemed it  
“reasonable.”3  Recent cases, however, may have altered these principles, but the ultimate 
difference lies in allegiances to divergent methods of determining whether a statute is 
ambiguous.
The nominal difference, however, emerged when Chevron deference was challenged as a 
norm in Christensen v. Harris County4 and United States v. Mead Corporation.5 These cases 
posited that some agency interpretations, even of ambiguous statutes, were not due binding 
deference under Chevron if they were reasonable, but would be subject to something referred to 
2
  467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id. at 842-43.
4
  529 U.S. 576 (2000).
5
  533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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as “respect” in certain circumstances.6  The cases  returned Skidmore deference to the active 
judicial repertoire.7 To some, this was a sudden and drastic change.8 However, the practical and 
actual impact of the cases has not been such, but the cases have contributed to a trend in which 
the agency interpretation of a statute is simply one interpretive tool among many other “canons” 
of construction, one to be employed or not at the option of the justice.
 Two recent cases underscore the status of agency interpretation as simply a tool of 
construction that can be ignored; the Supreme Court did not acknowledge underlying agency  
6
 See, Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587, and Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
7
 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (opining that agency rulings, 
interpretations and opinions “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority” 
can be informed judgments that may guide courts).
8
 See, Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (calling the majority’s ruling “an 
avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action”). Avulsion is the rapid 
change of land due to rapid movement of water.
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statutory interpretations in either Doe v. Chao9 or Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United States. 10
Agency construction is therefore on the level of legislative history or other aids to interpretation, 
such as canons, which may or may not be used at a justice’s option. The array of treatments of 
the agency interpretation - no deference, Chevron or Skidmore deference, or even no mention at 
all - makes it easier to impose judicial views that bind or will not bind in the future as a judicial 
declaration of “what the law is”under Marbury v. Madison.11 The technique of ignoring agency 
9
 124 S.Ct. 1204 (2004). 
10
 124 S.Ct. 1587 (2004).
11
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (often cited for the proposition that it is the 
responsibility for courts to declare “what the law is”). See,  Richard W. Murphy, A “New” 
Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV.1, 2 (2004) (Chevron labeled as putting interpretive power in agency, while 
Marbury put it in the courts). For an informative historic review of Marbury, see Mark A. 
Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 
609 (2002). 
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constructions when it suits a justice’s purpose is not limited to either the liberal or conservative 
ranks of justices, although Justice Scalia is the most verbal about retaining Chevron deference 
and avoiding the “ossifying” nature of a court “declaring what the law is.”12
Manipulation has long been a part of the judicial review of agency interpretation. Even 
with Chevron deference as the norm, justices only moved to the second step, namely ascertaining 
whether the agency interpretation is reasonable, if the statute is ambiguous. Justices engage their 
own statutory interpretation modes to determine whether the statute is ambiguous or whether 
Congress clearly spoke.  It is perhaps a cliche to say that “clarity,” like beauty, is in the eye of 
the beholder.  Nevertheless, Justices often show their differences at this point, with two rival 
methods of statutory interpretation driving the disagreement. “Textualists” find the words of the 
statute govern interpretation, but “intentionalists” look to the intent of the legislature, probing 
12 Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Under Chevron, if Congress was not 
clear, a court merely affirms or disaffirms the “reasonableness” of the agency position; it 
therefore only states that the law could or could not be what the agency proposes, not that a 
particular meaning is “the” one possible correct interpretation of the statute.
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into the purpose of the legislation and legislative history.13 By loosening the reins on deference 
to agency interpretations, the end-result has been a greater tendency to use these differing 
statutory methods to arrive at judicially preferred results. Agency interpretation has been 
relegated to the status of an aid to construction, rather than being the preferred method to resolve 
ambiguity in a statute.
This article in the next part will trace this development by first examining what the 
Christensen and Mead cases theoretically did. Part III will examine the status of deference to 
agency decisions in practice in the Supreme Court in the last two years, namely 2003 and 2004.  
In Part IV, the article places the debate in the context of the two theories of judicial discretion 
13
 For definitions, see generally, Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation 
and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (2003) and Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The 
Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules,” 51 Hastings L.J. 255, 264-274 (2000). See 
also, Marla E. Mansfield,  By the Dawn’s Early Light”: The Administrative State Still Stands 
after the 2000 Supreme Court Term (Commerce Clause, Delegation, and Takings),  37  Tulsa. L. 
Rev. 205, 232-240 (2001). Alternative terms for these interpretive modes are “formalists” for the 
textualist tendency and “purposivists” for the those who seek intent.
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and statutory interpretation. Part V concludes that agency interpretation has become analogous to 
a mere canon of construction. 
II. Christensen and Mead: Theoretical Change to Chevron?
A.  In the Supreme Court’s Words
Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court justices either simply restated the law of 
administrative deference to agency interpretation or radically altered it, depending on the 
individual justice’s perspective. Justice Scalia argued the latter had occurred, while other 
justices, to differing degrees, believed that the decision in Christensen, as explicated in Mead,
made no great modification in the law. The contention was over whether there was one standard 
of deference or several standards. Subsidiary questions would be what type of agency action 
would trigger which type of deference if more than one existed. A preliminary question, 
however, goes back to 1944, namely, what is “Skidmore deference?”
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In Skidmore v. Swift & Company,14 the Court considered whether employees who have to 
be “on call” at a meat packing plant to respond to fire alarms qualified for overtime pay under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Administrator did not formally adjudicate the matter, but had 
stated in a brief, that, given the examples put forward in its bulletins, the Administrator would 
count as “work” the time employees spent at the plant when they were neither sleeping nor
eating, explaining that the workers might have been preferred other pursuits for leisure time 
rather than presence at the plant.15 The Court considered the rationale for Congress creating the 
Administrator in the first place; Congress “impose[d] upon him a variety of duties, endow[ed] 
him with powers to inform himself of conditions in industries and employments subject to the 
Act, and put on him the duties of bringing injunction actions to restrain violations.”16 Something, 
therefore, was intended to result from the Administrator’s responsibilities and actions. To reflect 
this, bulletins and informal releases the Administrator promulgated, while not binding a court’s  
14
  323 U.S. 134 (1944).
15 Id., at 139.
16 Id., at 138.
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decision-making, would be entitled to “respect” when a judge interpreted the Act or appraised 
factual situations.17 The Court elaborated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this 
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend on the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give the power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.18
The Court adopted the reasoning of the Administrator, and lawyers and judges adopted the 
17 Id., at 139-140. See also, Id., at 139:  “The Administrator’s policies are made in 
pursuance of official duty, based upon specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information than is likely to come to a judge in a specific case.” 
18Id., at 140
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Skidmore name to describe the persuasive, but non-binding influence of well-reasoned agency 
statutory interpretations.
Moving forward in time, the Chevron case was decided, which operated on the premise 
that deference to agency interpretations was necessary when a statute was ambiguous and the 
agency interpretation of the statute was reasonable. For sixteen years, this case provided the 
primary guidance for aligning agency and judicial interpretive power.19 In 2000, however, the 
Christensen case was decided. Like Skidmore, Christensen arose in a setting where there was 
neither rule-making nor adjudication at issue. It also involved the same Act.  By this time, the 
Fair Labor Standards Act had been amended to allow state and local government employers to 
give compensatory paid time off in lieu of over time pay when workers were on the job more 
19
 The case was decided by only six justices and was not necessarily originally conceived 
as an important administrative law decision by the Court. See, Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy 
of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1997) (arguing that the 
Justices in deciding Chevron did not believe it to be a leading administrative law case, but 
simply a routine environmental case in which only six justices participated).
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than forty hours.20 The particular question in Christensen was whether the governmental 
employer could use “comp time”  unilaterally or must it only be used pursuant to a  labor 
agreement. In an amicus brief, the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour division took the 
position that an employer needed an agreement, and pointed to an opinion letter an Acting 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division signed, which letter also stated this position in 
response to the County’s question. Justice Thomas, writing for a majority of five, found that the 
statute did not forbid an employer from using compensatory time unilaterally.
In so doing,  Justice Thomas considered the influence of the Department’s position. 
There was neither formal adjudication nor notice-and-comment rulemaking. Chevron, he held, 
does not govern an agency interpretation that “lacks the force of law.”21  Such interpretations 
could be persuasive but “we find unpersuasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue 
20
 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
21 Id., at 587.
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in this case.”22 To defer to the agency in this instance would allow the agency to make a new 
regulation in the guise of interpreting a regulation.23  Justice Scalia concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment.
Justice Scalia agreed that the FLSA did not require an agreement before use of 
compensatory time, but objected to the implication that “authoritative” agency interpretations 
could be merely “persuasive,” rather than requiring deference to them under Chevron.24 First, he 
22 Id.
23 Id., at 588.“Unless the FLSA prohibits respondents from adopting its policy, 
petitioners cannot show that Harris County has violated the FLSA. And the FLSA contains no 
such prohibition.” See concurrence by Justice Souter, in which he clarifies his judgment that the 
FLSA could allow the Department to issue a regulation that allows it to prohibit forced use of 
compensatory time.
24 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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declared:  “Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism.”25 Second, he 
argued that the government’s brief established the opinion letter as authoritative, in the sense that 
it represented the official position of the administering agency.26 Therefore, Chevron applied.  
He concurred in the judgment, however, by applying the second step of Chevron and finding that 
“the Secretary’s position does not seem to me a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”27 Other 
Justices weighed in on the administrative law issue.
Two dissents were written, one by Justice Breyer and one by Justice Stevens. Justice 
Stevens gave the Departmental opinion “respect” under Skidmore and thus would require an 
agreement before the use of compensatory time.28 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
25 Id., at 589.
26 Id., at 591 n__ . Justice Scalia had been of record that Chevron should be employed 
whenever authoritative agency interpretations were involved, including those within briefs to the 
court. 
27 Id., at 591.
28 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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found the opinion letter authoritative and due Chevron deference because it was reasonable.29
Nevertheless, this dissent continued and registered disagreement with Justice Scalia’s position on 
the status of Skidmore: Chevron did not supercede it, but gave “an additional, separate legal 
reason for deferring to agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the 
agency the legal authority to make those determinations.”30  When there has been no such 
delegation, judges may use Skidmore. Justice Breyer suggested both modes of deference were 
applicable in the case and both supported affirming the agency interpretation.
The following year, in United States v. Mead Corp.,31 the Court continued to insist that 
Chevron did not eliminate deference under the Skidmore doctrine.32 Eight Justices joined Justice 
Souter’s opinion, with only Justice Scalia dissenting. At issue was whether “day planners” were 
“bound” “diaries” subject to a 4% tariff. The Federal Circuit refused to consider the Custom 
29 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore, three justices, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Scalia would have used Chevron to resolve the matter, albeit differing in result.
30 Id. Justice Stevens did not formally join this dissent, but noted that he concurred in its 
reading of Chevron. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 595, n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31
 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
32 Id., at 234. 
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Service’s interpretation, finding the day planners were neither bound nor diaries. The Supreme 
Court concurred that it was correct to not apply Chevron deference, but found that the lower 
court should have given some consideration of Skidmore deference.33
Justice Souter’s opinion attempted to delineate when one or the other of the two 
approaches to agency interpretations would be appropriate.34 In theory, Chevron applies only 
when “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make  rules carrying the force of 
law, and  that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of 
that authority.”35  Whether Congress had made such a delegation could be shown in various 
ways, most notably “by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”36 The Mead
decision explained: 
33 Id., at 227.
34
 However, noting that: “It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not 
marked by a hard-edged rule.” Id., at 237 n. 218.
35 Id.,  at 226-227.
36 Id., at 227.
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It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. . . 
.  Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference has reviewed 
the fruits of notice-and-comment rule making or formal adjudication 37
Although the Customs Service had the authority to engage in rule making with the force of law, 
there was a second inquiry: whether it had done so in the particular interpretation.38 In the 
current case, the type of ruling being relied upon numbered about 10,000 in a year and could be 
37 Id., at  230.
38
 With a fondness for numbers matching those of mathematicians, one commentator 
makes these two questions 1(a) and 1(b). Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative 
Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United 
States v. Mead, 107 Dick.  L. Rev. 289, 309-310(2002)(distinguishing whether agency has 
authority to “make law” and whether it did so in the particular). See also, Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 836 (2001) (adding the step of 
determining whether Chevron, Mead, or de novo review applies to the “Chevron two- step,” 
making this determination “Step Zero.”)
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generated in forty-six offices throughout the nation. To the court, these voluminous rulings could 
not have been intended to have the force of law.39
The fact that these rulings would not be binding if reasonable in the face of an ambiguous 
statute did not faze the Court. Because of the diverse statutory schemes for administrative action, 
a court needs a  variety of responses: 
Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s 
choice has been to tailor deference to variety. This acceptance  of the range of statutory 
variation has led the Court to recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just 
as the Court has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron
deference.40
More than one standard to evaluate an agency’s responsde to ambiguity is a benefit,  not a cause 
39 Id., at 233. (“In sum, classification rulings are best treated like ‘interpretations 
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.’"  citing, 
Christensen, 529 U.S., at 587).
40 Id., at 236-237.
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of dismay.
Although the potential for multiple standards left eight justices relatively unperturbed,41
Justice Scalia was the opposite. He claimed  the Court in Mead  had essentially discarded 
Chevron,42  and he scorned its replacement, calling it “that test most beloved by a court unwilling 
to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’ 
41
 Justice Breyer, particularly, but others also may concur that the review standards do not 
make much of a difference. According to one count, five Justices say that there are two deference 
doctrines, namely Chevron and Skidmore. These include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Souter, O’Connor, Thomas and Kennedy. Three justices - Stevens, Ginsburg, and  Breyer  - find 
one deference doctrine exists, of which Chevron and Skidmore are “separate manifestations.” 
The final Justice, Justice Scalia maintains there is simply one doctrine for review of agency 
statutory interpretations, and that it is Chevron. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 852 (2001). 
42 Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J. dissenting)(“We will be sorting out the consequences 
of the Mead doctrine, which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine.”)
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‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”43 To Justice Scalia, the result was deleterious not only in 
practical effect, but also in principle. Justice Scalia emphasized that Chevron was doctrinally an 
alignment of power between the executive and judicial branches: “[T]he doctrine of Chevron -
that all authoritative agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering 
deserve deference – was rooted in a legal presumption of congressional intent, important to the 
division of powers between the Second and Third Branches.”44 Assigning an interpretive 
antecedence to the agency allows the executive to fill in the interstices of the law; the Mead
approach did not so provide:  
Skidmore deference gives the agency’s current position some vague and uncertain 
amount of respect, but it does not, like Chevron, leave the matter within the control of the 
Executive Branch for the future. Once the court has spoken, it becomes unlawful for the 
agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court has 
43 Id., at 241. Justice Scalia abhorred such a holistic test. See, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1989) (arguing that when the 
Supreme Court decides a case on such a basis, it does not announce rules or resolve 
inconsistensies).
44 Id. (emphasis in original).
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prescribed.45
To Justice Scalia, the judiciary would disrupt the current alignment of power if  authoritative 
agency decisions were not simply deferred to when reasonable.
Beyond theory,  Justice Scalia also perceived a downside of the opinion in practice. 
Because the Mead approach uses multiple factors to assess agency decision-making, agencies 
will not know whether their interpretations will receive deference unless they use rule-making.46
If they do not use rule-making, the law will be decided by courts, which will remove an agency’s 
ability to respond to either changing conditions or changing politics: 
Worst of all, the majority’s approach will lead to the ossification of large portions of our 
statutory law. Where Chevron applies, statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject 
to the agency’s ongoing clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of 
continuing agency discretion.47
45 Id., at 247 (emphasis in original).
46 Id., at 246. He also avers that a side-effect of Mead would make timing important – i.e. 
if suit was before or after rule-making - which is  “positively bizarre.”  Id., at 247.
47 Id., at 247. 
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To Justice Scalia, the majority in Mead was not only wrong in principle, but the decision would 
have a devastating impact on the development of regulatory responses. It undermined agency 
flexibility and Congress’s ability to delegate. 
Reading the Supreme Court Justices’ own words in Christensen and Mead reveals two 
potential theoretical impacts on administrative law from the cases. The first, espoused by the 
majority, is that the cases mildly adjusted administrative law, clarifying that courts could review 
agency interpretations of statutes pursuant to different existent standards. The second, trumpeted 
by Justice Scalia, is that the cases would wreak havoc on the alignment of executive and 
judiciary power, leading to a crisis in regulation. Neither of these assessments turns out to 
perfectly predict how nor whether Supreme Court treatment of agency pronouncements would 
change. 
B. In the Words of Law Review Article Authors
Since Mead and Christensen, numerous articles have considered on these cases 
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particularly or on judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation more generally.48  The 
commentators’ initial reactions vary through yawning, bemoaning, and cheering. These positions 
are briefly surveyed. 
Some who read the decisions saw the same potential downside that Justice Scalia did: 
they feared a loss of agency flexibility. If courts ultimately determined “what the law is” 
pursuant to a Skidmore review, then agencies would be bound in the future to the meaning the 
judiciary declared.49 The judiciary’s supremacy under Marbury v. Madison would be secured, 
unless the agency proceeded by formal rule-making,50 which would grant the present agency 
decision Chevron deference and  also allow the agency to change its position with reasonable 
48
 A WestLaw search on Aug. 18, 2004, revealed 15 articles with Mead in the title and 95 
articles with Christensen, Chevron, or Skidmore in the title for the preceding three years 
(computed after deleting those referring to different cases by the same name). Naturally, not all 
articles on the topic include the case name in their title, as evidenced by the title of the present 
article.
49
 Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the Power to “Say What 
the Law Is,’, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 839, 841-42 (2002) (characterizing Mead as representing 
an expansion of the Marbury power to say what the law is at the expense of Chevron deference).
50
 Or by formal adjudication, in a reversal of early hesitancy to allow 
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explanation. Chevron review alone comported with Marbury because the theoretical basis for 
Chevron is that Congress delegated interpretation to the agency. To change this could be 
detrimental to regulatory response to changing conditions or policies. For this and other reasons, 
some authors classified Mead and Christensen as mistakes.51
To the contrary, others found that an agency could still have flexibility if a court 
reviewed its  interpretation with Skidmore respect. The agency’s position and explanation would 
be considered in the initial review; its change would be a factor to consider and weigh in any 
later review.52 Allowing judges to consider agency interpretation as mandatorily binding in some 
circumstances and  under a more fact-specific rubric at other times allows for the best alignment 
of resources.53 Freeing the judiciary from the constraints of Chevron enhances the role of the 
51
 Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 
361  (2003) (arguing the cases are a “failed experiment” because judges become mired in 
disputes on the type of deference required).
52
  Murphy, supra note   , at 46-48.
53
 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 857 
(2001) (arguing legal system works better with two ways to make use of agency experience, 
including one that is not mandatory).
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judiciary as a true and honest check and balance on the executive.
In between, there were those who felt that the two cases did not necessarily make much 
of a practical change.54 Within this group were those who felt that there truly could only be two 
possible states of mind: deference or no deference to the agency position. There would not be 
room for an intermediate “respect.” Therefore, the difference in terminology and citation would 
represent   “mood points” rather than a stark differentiation of philosophy.55
54
 Ronald Krotosynski, Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the 
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 752-54 (arguing that Skidmore review 
fits in to the APA as simply an “arbitrary & capricious” review for rationality), But see, Patricia 
M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies 
Plays On, 32 Tulsa L. J. 221, 244 (1996) (arguing against collapsing Chevron review and 
arbitrary and capricious analysis because Chevron concentrates on “statutory language, structure 
and purpose” and the other analysis concentrates on the “agency’s decisionmaking process and 
explanations”). 
55
 Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual 
Deference Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 173 (2002).
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III. Supreme Court Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation in Practice
In the past two years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed agency interpretations 
of statutes. Without claiming to be all-inclusive, twelve decisions are reviewed in this part of the 
article56 and some categorization is attempted. In some cases, the Court acknowledges different 
standards of reviewing agency pronouncements and in others it cites all the precedents 
indiscriminately. Moreover, results and methodology vary across the spectrum, from demanding 
to hear from agencies to not even acknowledging that agencies had already spoken. In all, there 
has been no systemic transformation of administrative law, but a cacophony has replaced that 
single-note Chevron citation refrain. 
A. Models of Review Both Distinguished and Blurred
Some cases do seem to distinguish at least two types of review.57 In fact, there are some 
56
 See also, Part IV.
57
 Naturally, three possibilities exist: deference under Chevron, deference or “respect” 
under Skidmore, or de novo review. The latter position is subsumed in the question of whether 
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stabs at making principled distinctions between agency activities and the type of appropriate 
deference. However, no clarity emerges from the particular cases. To the contrary, some cases 
purposefully refuse to distinguish which review model is being applied and deny that any 
practical effect arises from the choice of either Chevron or Skidmore defense.
In Washington State Department of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler,58 there appeared to be a delineation of when Chevron deference was appropriate. 
Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous court, addressing a situation where a State became a 
“representative payee” on behalf of a child in state foster care who was eligible for Social 
Security benefits. The question was  “whether the State’s use of Social Security benefits to 
reimburse itself for some of its initial expenditures violates a provision of the Social Security Act 
protecting benefits from ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.’”59 To 
approve the practice, the Court had to determine three subsidiary issues. In so doing, the Court 
found Chevron deference appropriate to uphold agency pronouncements on two issues. The third 
the statute involved is ambiguous. If the statute is not, the court will interpret it by standard 
statutory construction.
58
  537 U.S. 371 (2003).
59 Id., at 375, quoting  42 U.S.C. § 407(a). 
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agency interpretation garnered respect under Skidmore and Mead.
The two situations in which Chevron deference was employed differed. First, the Court 
determined whether the statute prohibited a payee from in anyway being tempted to perform 
“creditor-type acts.”  The Court found that both the Act and the regulations implementing it 
allow creditors to serve as representative payees and even to satisfy old debts from payments in 
certain circumstances. Chevron was cited at this point for needed deference.60 Because notice-
and-comment regulations were involved, this was not surprising. The second use of Chevron was 
in a different setting, but first the Court needed to resolve an intermediary question, for which 
Chevron was not a suitable option. 
The Court had to determine whether the state obtained the benefits in a manner that 
violated the statute’s prohibition of “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
process.”61 In making the determination, the court employed the canons of noscitor a socciis and 
60 Id., at 382.
61
 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
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ejusdem generis to read “other legal process” restrictively.62 The Court bolstered this conclusion 
by examining the Social Security’s Program Operations Manual Systems, which read the words 
in a similar manner: 
62 Washington, 537 U.S. at 385.  ( “Require[s] utilization of some judicial or quasi 
judicial mechanism.. .by which control over property passes from one person to another in order 
to discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability.”)  
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While these administrative interpretations are not products of formal rulemaking, they 
nevertheless warrant respect in closing the door on any suggestion that the usual rules of 
statutory construction should get short shrift for the sake of reading ‘other legal process’ 
in abstract breadth. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944); see also United States v. 
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Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 228 (2001).63
The court, therefore, referenced a specific agency pronouncement that contained a statutory 
analysis and employed some degree of respect for it, albeit not Chevron deference.
63 Id., at 385-86.
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To answer the last question, the Court did not reference a particular regulation or ruling, 
but implicitly looked at the agency’s actual appointment of the state as a representative payee. 
This final question was whether appointing a representative payee, which would make payments 
to itself for reimbursement,  would promote the “best interests” of a beneficiary. The Court, citing 
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Chevron,64 found that interpreting such “an open-ended and potentially vague term is highly 
susceptible to administrative interpretation subject to judicial deference.”65 The Administrator 
could choose to assure beneficiaries receive basic needs rather than seeking to maximize a trust 
64 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
65 Washington, 537 U.S., at 390. 
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fund because of overlapping federal and state largesse. Although no particular regulation was 
cited for this premise, the Court had looked at several regulations and the end result. Although the 
form of the agency interpretation was not the necessarily within the Mead safe-harbor for 
Chevron deference,66 Justice Souter emphasized the rationale for Chevron deference in assigning 
66
 Notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, 
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the agency the right to make the judgment: an implicit delegation of policy-making to the agency. 
Chevron, thus, would be employed for law-making activities pursuant  to rule-making and to 
clearly delegated policy choices. The Mead reference to Skidmore respect was used in other 
situations, although the Court in Washington State additionally used other means to interpret the 
statute.
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A gestalt therefore would seem to be developing in Washington State, but other cases 
simply cited both cases or refused to distinguish between the standards. For example, Justice 
Breyer cited both Chevron and Skidmore in support of an agency interpretation in Meyer v. 
Holley.67 This dual citation is not totally surprising; Justice Breyer in his dissent in Christensen
67
  537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003): “For another thing, the Department of Housing and 
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maintained that Chevron did not supercede Skidmore, but gave “an additional, separate legal 
Urban Development (HUD), the federal agency primarily charged with the implementation and 
administration of the statutes... has specified that ordinary vicarious liability rules apply in this 
area. And we ordinarily defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984), Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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reason for deferring to agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the agency 
the legal authority to make those determinations” and suggested both were applicable and both 
supported affirming agency interpretation in that case.68  He similarly cited both decisions in 
68 Christensen,  529 U.S. at 596. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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Barnhart v. Walton,69 but concluded that Chevron deference was appropriate in light of the entire 
setting of the agency interpretation.  
The Barnhart case revolved on the meaning of the word “disability,” which is a predicate 
69
  535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002).
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to establishing eligibility for certain Social Security benefits. The Social Security Administration 
had long-used a definition that required not only that the impairing condition last more than a 
year, but that a claimant’s “inability to work” also last that long.  The Administration had only 
recently adopted the definition in notice-and- comment proceedings.70 The recent nature of the 
70 Id., at 214-215.
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rule-making led the claimant, who opposed use of the definition, to claim that the rule was too 
new and developed in response to litigation; therefore, the rule should not be entitled to deference.  
The Court, however,  rejected this argument: there is no bright-line rule that only notice-
Submission draft
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and-comment rule-making receives Chevron deference.71 Justice Breyer, in a discussion that all 
Justices signed on to except Justice Scalia, explained that whether or not an agency interpretation 
gets Chevron deference “depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the 
71 Id., at 222.
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nature of the question at issue.”72 Applying this, the Court concluded:  
In this case the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, 
the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that 
72 Id.
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administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a 
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through 
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.73
73 Id. Justice Breyer’s scholarship perhaps presaged this position. Stephen Breyer, Judicial 
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370-73 (1986) (suggesting that to 
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solve the problem of finding implied delegation to agencies, courts should look for implicit intent, 
by judging what a reasonable legislator might have thought about delegation based on the facts 
and practicalities of the particular enactment; the factors would resemble, perhaps, pre-Chevron
analysis). 
Submission draft
45
The clear import is that a holistic approach is not only appropriate to decide whether to use 
Skidmore deference, but a multi-factor approach also determines whether to apply Chevron.
Justice Scalia rebelled: “The SSA’s recently enacted regulations emerged from notice-and-
comment rulemaking and merit deference. No more need be said.”74 This reflects his disgust with 
74 Walton, 535 U.S. at 227  (Scalia, J. concurring).
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less than definitive rules, a disgust that  he had registered strongly in his Mead dissent.75
Justice Scalia found other cases also required dissent,76 even when Justice Ginsberg  did 
75 Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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apply a fairly straightforward analysis of whether Chevron deference should be used.77 Most 
76
 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 124 S.Ct. 983,    (2003) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas joined the dissent.
77
 124 S.Ct. 983 (2003). Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter and Breyer concurred.
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likely therefore, the disagreement was not on administrative law, but on where the Justices put the 
fulcrum of power between state and federal regulators. The setting was regulating emissions 
under the Clean Air Act.  The Alaska Department of Environmental Quality (ADEC) had issued a 
permit for a zinc mine expansion, but did not employ what would be the most stringent 
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technology, know as SCR (selective catalytic reduction), but allowed a different technology to be 
used on both new generating units and existing units at the project.78 The EPA employed  
78
 According to the Clean Air Act,  if a source of pollution would be intended for an area 
that meets the ambient air quality standards, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program 
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authorities in the CAA to stop construction of the generators,79 alleging that the ADEC did not 
requires that the permitting agency issue a permit and provide that the source employ the “Best 
Available Control Technology.” 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
79
 The CAA provides in Section 113(a)(5) 42 U.S.C.  § 7413(a) that the EPA, if it finds 
that a State generally has not complied with a “requirement” necessary to construct a polluting 
Submission draft
51
source, could pursue remedial action, including issuing “an order prohibiting construction.” 
Additionally, the CAA empowers the EPA within the PSD program to “take such measures, 
including issuance of an order, ... as necessary to prevent the construction” of a major pollutant 
emitting facility that does not conform to the “requirements” of the program. Section 167, 42 
U.S.C.    . 
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adequately explain its choice of required technology, therefore rendering its BACT determination 
arbitrary and capricious and thus not fulfilling a requirement of the program.  The EPA 
interpreted the requirement to have a BACT determination in the permits “to mandate not simply 
a BACT designation, but a determination of BACT faithful to the statute’s definition.”80
80 Alaska Department of Environmental Quality, 124 S.Ct. at 1000 (emphasis in the 
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          In what would appear to be a straightforward review of an agency action, Justice Ginsburg 
upheld the EPA’s decision. She cited EPA interpretive guides that had been published in 1983, 
1988, and 1993, as well as other documents that contained EPA’s position that it had oversight 
original). 
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ability to ascertain whether a state had made a determination that was within the meaning of the 
CAA.81 Because these were not notice and comment rule-makings, but were within “internal 
guidance memoranda,” they were not given Chevron deference, but Justice Ginsberg found them 
81 Id., at 1001.
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worthy of “respect.” 82 She reviewed the arguments raised against the EPA’s interpretation, but 
found them incapable of persuading the court “to reject as impermissible EPA’s longstanding, 
consistently maintained interpretation.”83
82 Id.
83 Id.
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The dissenting justices, however, accused Justice Ginsburg of giving Chevron deference 
to the EPA’s opinion. Justice Kennedy cites the majority’s description of the agency’s ruling as 
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“not impermissible,” “permissible,” or “rational.”84 The dissent would find no deference 
appropriate because  the statute “clearly” required the EPA to appeal the state’s BACT 
84 Alaska Department of Environmental Quality, 124 S.Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J. 
dissenting).
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determination through judicial review of the state’s exercise of discretion in the state courts.85 The 
major objection of the dissent to EPA’s position was that it upset the balance of power between 
the state and federal government in enforcing the CAA. The dissent positioned that power in the 
85 Id., at 1013.
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state, with very limited room for the EPA to be proactive after a state program was approved.86
86 Id.  (Finding that the EPA had “no roving commission to ferret out arbitrary and 
capricious conduct by state agencies under the state equivalent of the APA. That task is left to 
state courts.”) A similar concern with federalism led the same justices to a similarly tortured 
statutory interpretation in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army 
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Conversely, federalism issues might appear to lead to deference in Wisconsin Dept. of 
Corp. of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (hereinafter “Solid Waste”). See further discussion at 
notes, infra.    
Submission draft
61
Health & Family Services v. Blumer,87 but the alignment of the justices makes it more likely a 
difference of statutory interpretation.88 The issue was whether Wisconsin could use the “income-
87
 543 U.S. 473 (2002).
88
 Justice Scalia, often aligned with proponents of state initiative, was in the dissent in this 
case. 
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first” method of computing eligibility for Medicaid.89 Justice Ginsberg cites departmental 
89
  Under the “income first” method, the “community spouse” (the spouse outside an 
institution) retains his/her own income and statutory share of the assets,  but if the income is too 
low, then the institutionalized spouse gives some income to the community spouse. This differs 
from the “resources first” method, which would give more assets to the community spouse to 
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precedent, such as a Chicago Regional State Letter, the Petition for Certiorari, and a proposed rule 
that would allow either income -first or resources-first methods “in the spirit of Federalism.”90
allow more income to be generated for that spouse. The “income first” method delays eligibility 
for Medicaid assistance and requires more of a spend down of assets before eligibility is met.
90 Wisconsin Dept., 543 U.S. at 497.
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She held that the  “Secretary’s position warrants respectful consideration.”91 The dissent, also 
citing Mead, held that the inconsistent positions and lack of analysis made deference 
91 Id. (citing U.S. v. Mead) Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 
and Breyer concurred.
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inappropriate. It also held that “[t]he statute is not ambiguous,”92 but did not therefore dismiss all 
possibilities of any deference by citation to the first step of Chevron.  Therefore, all the Justices 
were seemingly using Mead as the designated standard of review, but one set of Justices found it 
92 Wisconsin Dept., 543 U.S. at 505 (Stevens, J, dissenting) Justices O’Connor and Scalia 
joined the dissent.
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easier to glean Congressional intent from the wording of the statute and therefore ignore an 
agency interpretation.
In other situations, however, the clarity of the statute being construed led Justices to 
directly refuse to distinguish which form of deference was appropriate. Either no deference was 
Submission draft
67
due because  the agency was clearly wrong93 or no deference was needed because the agency was 
93
 General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 1248 (2004) (Souter, J.)  
(“... we neither defer nor settle on any degree of deference because the Commission is clearly 
wrong”) (ADEA protects only older workers from preferences for younger workers, and does not 
protect younger workers from benefits given older workers). Justice Scalia would defer to the 
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agency entrusted with the statute, which had stated in a regulation that age could not be the basis 
of a hiring decision between two parties over 40, even if the elder was chosen. General Dynamics, 
124 S.Ct. at 1249 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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clearly right.94  This last position, namely that it is immaterial to determine what type of deference 
is needed when affirming the agency, was challenged by the concurrence in Edelman v. 
94 General Dynamics,  124 S.Ct. at 1251 (Thomas, J. dissenting)(agreeing that Court does 
not have to determine type of deference due to agency but “because the EEOC’s interpretation is 
consistent with the best reading of the statute....”).
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Lynchburg College.95 Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, raised the philosophical 
question of whether or not the judiciary had “declared what the law is” with finality: 
The Court reserved the question of whether the EEOC’s regulation is entitled to Chevron
95
 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment). 
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deference. I doubt that it is possible to reserve this question while simultaneously 
maintaining, as the Court does, that the agency is free to change its interpretation. To say 
that the matter is ambiguous enough to permit agency choice and to suggest that the Court 
could countenance a different choice is to say that the Court would (because it must) defer 
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to a reasonable agency choice.96
To these two Justices, the legal call must reside either in the court or the agency, and Skidmore
96 Id.
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and Chevron point to different branches having primacy. The remaining justices,97 however, felt 
97
 Justice Thomas joined the majority and also wrote a short concurrence in which he 
offered that he read the majority opinion to find the regulation “reasonable” and “not proscribed 
by the statute.” Edelman,  535 U.S. at 119 (Thomas, J. concurring). He therefore might not have 
found the statute to read “clearly” in one direction.
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that if the meaning of the statute was clear, it need not delineate which type of deference was at 
issue and also opined that this position would not foreclose the agency from later changing its 
interpretation.98
98
 Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Edelman, in which all the remaining 
Justices joined. Edelman, 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002)  A regulation of the EEOC was at issue, but 
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The theoretical differences between Skidmore and Chevron, therefore, do not seem to have  
not one adopted with notice and comment procedures. Notice and comment are not required for 
EEOC regulations. Therefore, the  Mead safe-haven rules could not resolve whether Chevron
deference was appropriate. Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114, n7.
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mattered much. Although the Washington State case and some other cases distinguished the two 
forms of deference, other than assuming Chevron applies to notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
formal adjudication, there has been little line-drawing. The majority of the Court also shows little 
concern on the matter which so greatly disturbed Justice Scalia, namely that under Skidmore
deference the judiciary determines “what the law is,” which could bind the agency in the future.  
Under Chevron, the agency could determine and re-determine the meaning of an ambiguous 
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statute.  Most Justices either ignored the conundrum, or, when deciding a case and employing 
Skidmore, used respect for the agency opinion to “bolster” interpretations of the statute that were 
arrived at through other means.99
99 See, Washington, 537 U.S. at 385-86.
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B. Quests for Agency Input
Sometimes, however, the opportunity for an agency to make at least a preliminary call on 
the legal question of statutory meaning appears significant to some Justices. Cases that were not 
reviews of agency action brought this need to the fore. In these cases,  the tension between 
judicial and agency roles in statutory interpretation is illuminated. Purportedly, as in the typical 
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review of agency action, the agency is nominally the policy maker.
For example, in a convoluted ruling the Justices held that a preliminary injunction was 
inappropriate when based on the premise that Medicaid pre-empted  Maine’s “Rx Program” 
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because of obstacle pre-emption.100 This was not a review of an agency decision and the United 
100
 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003).  The state program requires drug manufacturers to give all consumers a negotiated price; 
the state would require pre-approval for the manufacturer’s drugs under Medicaid if a 
manufacturer refused. Id., at 653-54.  The Court also found that the program, on its face, did not 
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unduly burden interstate commerce. It noted that on all issues, facts could be developed on 
remand. Three Justices, however, dissented, upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction 
on the basis of the facts then before it, which revealed no benefit to Medicaid from the prior 
authorization requirement. Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part; joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy).
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States was not a party to the case. The plurality therefore emphasized that this situation differed 
from a judicial review, which would follow if the Secretary of Health and Human Services would 
find Maine’s plan invalid after the agency examined it for conformity with Medicaid. In that case, 
the Secretary’s view would be “presumptively valid,” rather than beginning a pre-emption 
Submission draft
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analysis with the presumption that the state law is valid.101 Three members of the plurality 
emphasized that the opinion did not decide whether Maine had to seek the Secretary’s approval of 
101 Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., writing for self and Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
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the Program, but noted the issue may arise in the future.102 Therefore, they registered some degree 
of desire for agency input. Three other justices insisted more strongly on agency involvement.
One such justice was the fourth member of the plurality, Justice Breyer. In addition to 
102 Id., at 668.(Stevens, J. writing for self and Justices Souter and Ginsburg).
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noting the possible need for Secretarial approval of Maine’s program, he suggested that, on 
remand, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would enable the court to refer the question of 
whether Maine’s program interferes with Medicaid to the agency.103 This would allow the court to 
103Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 673 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment).
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retain jurisdiction while obtaining the agency’s views. Two additional justices only concurred in 
the judgment and would have not only have dissolved the preliminary injunction, but also would 
have dismissed the case.
These two justices had differing rationales for their objections, both encompassing the 
need for agency action. Justice Scalia maintained that the objecting industry group’s sole remedy 
Submission draft
87
was to petition the Secretary to enforce the Medicaid provisions by terminating the state’s funding 
for Medicaid as a sanction for the State violating its obligations. Court action could only be 
invoked to review the Secretary’s decision to not so enforce the Medicaid Act.104 This comports 
104Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 675 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
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with Justice Scalia’s theoretical enthusiasm for Chevron: the agency has the primary role in 
interpreting ambiguous statutes. Justice Thomas also maintained that judicial review of a 
Secretary’s decision would be the only appropriate route into court, but for a different reason, 
which also centered on agency prerogatives.
Justice Thomas argued that it would be impossible for the industry group to forward an 
obstacle preemption claim directly in court, without agency input at the threshold. He referred to 
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familiar concepts in judicial review of agency statutory interpretation in his analysis of obstacle 
preemption decision-making. Justice Thomas defined “obstacle pre-emption as “turn[ing] on 
whether the goals of the federal statute are frustrated by the effect of the state law.”105 To Justice 
Thomas,  to go directly to the Court is actually an allegation that the statute is unambiguous and 
105 Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 679 (Thomas, J. concurring in judgment). 
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precludes approval of Maine’s Rx Program.106 He fits this into the Chevron agency review 
paradigm: if the Secretary had approved the program, then his decision would be overturned at 
106
 Id.,  at 680.
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step one of Chevron.107 In addition to Justice Thomas’s belief that Congress had not clearly 
spoken on the issue, he found that an allegation of obstacle pre-emption is inconsistent with an 
allegation that a statute is unambiguous:
107 Id. (Chevron requires rejection of agency interpretation if Congress has “directly 
spoken” in a contrary manner).
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Obstacle pre-emption’s very premise is that Congress has not expressly displaced state 
law, and thus not ‘directly spoken’ to the pre-emption question. Therefore, when an 
agency is charged with administering a federal statute as the Secretary is here, Chevron
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imposes a perhaps-insurmountable barrier to a claim of obstacle pre-emption.108
It is the agency that must consider the differing goals and purposes of the Medicaid Act to 
ascertain whether the Maine Rx Program disrupts the balance struck by Congress; the delegation 
108 Id., at 681.
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of this task to the agency “precludes federal court intervention on the basis of obstacle pre-
emption.”109 Naturally, if either the state or the industry group dislikes the agency’s decision, the 
displeased may seek judicial review.
109 Id., at 682.
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In all, six Justices in Pharmaceutical Research had some degree of discomfort with 
deciding whether Maine’s Program comported with the Medicaid statute without the input of the 
administering agency. The remaining three were content to make some statutory interpretation 
and to find the trial judge had not abused his discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.110
110 Pharmaceutical Research, 538 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and 
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Although the case does not directly deal with how to review agency interpretations, it does 
highlight that the Justices at least give lip service to the goal of receiving agency input.
dissenting in part) (statute forecloses prior authorization requirements for Medicaid beneficiaries 
with no Medicaid related goals). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined the opinion. 
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In another, more typical setting for judicial review, there was a disagreement as to what, if 
anything, an agency had actually decided. The case was New York  v. FERC,111 in which two 
questions were resolved. The first was whether FERC correctly assumed jurisdiction over 
111
 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
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unbundled transmission connected with interstate retail sales of electricity.112  The Court 
112
 At least two things must be purchased if someone wants electricity to be used at a 
particular location: the actual megawatts of electricity and the transportation of the electricity 
(referred to as transmission) to the specific locale of use. In the past, most transactions were 
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completed with one provider, often an integrated utility,  giving both the commodity and the 
transmission. These would be “bundled” sales. With the advent of independent power generators 
and more open access to the transmission grid, some consumers could purchase their electricity 
separately, and then seek transmission to their locale in a separate transaction. This would be an 
“unbundled” retail sale, so-described because the electricity and the transmission were contracted 
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unanimously answered this question affirmatively, upholding jurisdiction over interstate 
transmission. The second question was whether FERC correctly abstained from jurisdiction over 
interstate transmission “bundled” with retail interstate sales.  The Court split six-to-three on the 
latter question. The dispute centered on what decision, if any, the agency might have made on the 
for separately.
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question and to what extent such decision could be subject to deference. 
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the entire court found clear statutory language in the 
Federal Power Act on federal jurisdiction over interstate transmission: “There is no language in 
the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute 
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does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.”113 Therefore, FERC could assert 
113
 New York, 535 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original). See, Section 201(b) of the Federal 
Power Act: “The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce ant to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce ....” 16 
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jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce. The majority of the Court 
also found that FERC had not disclaimed jurisdiction over transmission bundled with retail sales, 
but simply found it unnecessary to address the issue in a rulemaking concerned primarily with the 
wholesale market. Concurring with the Court of Appeals, the majority called FERC’s decision “a 
U.S.C. § 824 (b).
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statutorily permissible policy choice.”114 The majority cited neither Chevron nor Mead. The 
language, however, was reminiscent of Chevron.
114 New York, 535 U.S. at 28, quoting case below, Transmission Access Policy Group v. 
FERC, 225 F. 3d 667,  694-95 (C.A.D.C. 2000).
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Although the majority upheld the agency without citation, the dissent on this issue, which 
Justice Thomas wrote and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined, questioned whether FERC had 
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actually answered the second question in the manner the majority described.115 Therefore, it 
discussed the scope of cases that support deference. The dissent examined two issues: 1) whether 
FERC properly found no need to regulate transmission in bundled  retail sales,  and 2) whether 
115 New York, 535 U.S. at   (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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FERC had jurisdiction over retail jurisdiction should it later determine a need to regulate. On both 
issues, more was needed than the FERC’s current record.
The dissent first noted that FERC failed to explain why regulating bundled transmission 
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was not “necessary” to correct “undue discrimination.”116 This omission  required remand.117
116 Id., at 30-31.See also,  Id., at 34-35: “The fact that FERC found undue discrimination 
with respect to transmission used in connection with both bundled and unbundled wholesale sales 
and unbundled retail sales indicates that such discrimination exists regardless of whether the 
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transmission is used in bundled or unbundled sales. Without more, FERC’s conclusory statement 
that ‘unbundling of retail transmission’ is not ‘necessary’ lends little support to its decision not to 
regulate such transmission. And it simply cannot be the case that the nature of the commercial 
transaction controls the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction.”
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Moreover, the dissenters read the statute as unambiguously granting FERC jurisdiction over 
117 Id., at 42. 
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interstate transmission of electricity.118 Even if the statute was ambiguous, Chevron would not be 
applicable  because FERC never truly resolved the jurisdictional issue, but refused to resolve it: 
“the Court will defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, this
118 Id., at  37.
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passage [in FERC’s rule-making] does not provide an interpretation to which the Court can 
defer.”119  Additionally, the dissent found FERC’s statements on whether or not it had such 
jurisdiction to be contradictory and inconsistent: “These inconsistencies alone, however, convince 
119 Id., at  38.
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me that the Court should [not] defer. . . . ” 120 The dissent noted that the majority did not weigh 
the fact that the agency altered its opinion in determining whether the Court should defer. 
According to the cited case, namely United States v. Mead Corp., the changing appraisal of 
120 Id.
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jurisdiction should have been a factor in deciding what deference might be due FERC’s 
decision.121
121 Id. at   , citing 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
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These instances of the Justice seeking agency input show that at some level there is still 
respect for the rationales for  the existence of agencies, which parallel arguments for deference. 
Congress often creates agencies to make policy choices that could not be stated clearly in 
legislation. Reasons for the ambiguity reflect the numerous deficiencies inherent in the 
legislature: it often lacks the time, the expertise, and the political will to solve complex regulatory 
issues. Therefore, as Chevron notes, there is some degree of delegation to the agency of the 
Submission draft
116
decisional power. Additionally, it would be foolish to dismiss off-handedly any wisdom the 
agency could have accumulated, which is the heart of Skidmore’s justification for deference.
C. Reviews That Do Not Acknowledge Agency Interpretation
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More intriguing than the times that the Supreme Court seeks agency views are the times 
that it fails to even explicitly acknowledge the existence of these views as the Justices present 
their analyses. This is not simply that they declare that Congress has clearly spoken on a matter, 
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which would be a reason to grant no deference to a contrary agency opinion.122 In the subject 
122
 See notes, supra. 
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cases, there is no mention of the agency interpretation as a starting point.123
123
 This situation also differs from one in which the agency argues a position in a brief, but 
cannot reference a pre-existing departmental position. Although at one point such interpretations 
might have garnered deference, Justice O’Connor, speaking for all Justices except Justice Scalia, 
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questioned such deferential treatment, noting “the Government does not identify any 
administrative documents in which EPA has espoused that position.” South Florida Water 
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 124 S.Ct. 1537, 1544 (2004) (refusing to 
decide whether no permit was needed to discharge water from one navigable water to another 
because of the unitary nature of navigable waters). The majority in the case suggested that the 
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121
issue of the unitary nature of the waters could be addressed on remand; Justice Scalia would not 
have addressed the issue at all nor remanded the case. South Florida Water Management District, 
124 S.Ct. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The brief for the 
government had not cited either Chevron or Mead as requiring deference for its position. See, 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2003 WL 22137034 (Sept. 
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For example, the opinion for the Court in Doe v. Chao124 does not discuss the Office of 
10, 2003).
124
 124 S.Ct. 1204 (2004). The Department of Labor had revealed the petitioner’s Social 
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Security number as it adjudicated Black Lung Benefits in violation of the Privacy Act’s 
restrictions on promulgation of the number. The Department agreed that the disclosure was 
intentional and willful. Id., at 1206. Moreover, the government agreed that the plaintiff was 
“adversely affected” by the disclosure of his number for fear of identity theft or credit injury Doe 
v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. at 1212 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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Management and Budget Guideline that interpreted the Privacy Act.125 This is not because the 
parties  ignored the Guideline; the petitioner cited Mead and argued that the opinion of the OMB 
125
  See, Doe v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. at 1215-16 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) Justices Breyer and 
Stevens joined the dissent.
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was entitled to respect because it was contemporaneous, longstanding, and comported with the 
Act’s language, structure, purpose, and context.126 The government response acknowledged the 
126
 Brief for Petitioner, 2003 WL 22038406.
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Guideline, but obviously concluded the opposite about its correctness.127 The question in the case 
127
 Brief for Respondent, 2003 WL 2248 9257 at page 47-48 (alleging that the OMB 
disavowed the position because OMB belatedly understood that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
was involved).
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was whether a claimant who had proven an adverse effect from the Department of Labor’s willful 
and intentional violation of the Privacy Act would be entitled to a minimum amount of $1000 
damages, even if he could not prove actual monetary damages from the illegal disclosure of his 
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128
Social Security number.128
128
 Under the Privacy Act of 1974, a person must proving “adverse” effect from a failure 
to comply with the act. See,  5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1). Moreover, if “the court determines that the 
agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the 
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individual in an amount equal to the sum of -  (A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a 
result of the refusal or failure [to comply], but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery 
receive less than the sum of $1,000; and  (B) the cost of the action together with reasonable 
attorney fees as determined by the court.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4)(g)(1)(D).
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Justice Souter, writing for the majority, did not mention the OMB interpretation and held 
that the clear reading of the statute required an “actual damage” before there was any ability to get 
the minimum payment based on a  “straight-forward textual analysis.”129  The dissent’s textual 
129 Doe v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. at 1208. Justice Souter was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
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analysis, however, reached the opposite conclusion.130 More importantly, the dissenting opinion 
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor. Justice Scalia did not join in certain 
aspects of the opinion, namely those that examined legislative history.
130 Doe v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. at 1214 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (arguing that the different 
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notes that Congress charged OMB to interpret the Act, which it did almost contemporaneously. 
Its Guidelines, amended several times since, always required payment of  “actual damages or 
words “actual damages sustained by the individual”” and “person entitled to recovery” should not 
be equated).
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$1,000,  whichever is greater.”131 No mention of either Chevron or Mead was made; the 
131 Id., at 1215-16. The opinion also noted that the brief of the government argued that an 
OMB official stated that OMB no longer interpreted the Guideline to require paying a party 
without actual damages $1000. The response was that “[s]uch an informal communication cannot 
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134
interpretation simply seemed to bolster her reading of the statute, as did the purpose of the statute 
override OMB’s contemporaneous, long-published construction of § 552a(g)(4).” Id., at 1216, n. 
2. This treatment is in accord with a Mead-like review. 
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and its legislative history.132 The  agency interpretation had no special status.
Examination of the briefs and oral argument may illuminate why it was decided the way it 
132 Id., at 1216.
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was. The government’s brief argued that the true issue was whether the government’s sovereign 
immunity was waived, an issue on which an agency purportedly had no special expertise.133  The 
government and Justices also expressed concern that the public fisc would be too greatly 
133
 Brief for Respondent, 2003 WL 2248 9257, at 48.
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challenged if minimum damages were awarded to all parties adversely affected.134  Therefore, the 
134
 Brief for Respondent, 2003 WL 2248 9257, at  pg. 22, fn 5 (delineating parade of 
terribles about the amount of liability possible). See also, Justice Breyer, who in his dissent 
notes that there is no danger to the public fisc because “intentional or willful” has been narrowly 
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agenda against interpreting the Privacy Act in the manner the agency once did was perhaps 
construed by the courts so as to require some degree of bad faith on the part of the responsible 
officer. Doe v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J. dissenting) and the questions to the petitioner 
about the costs to the government if class actions were allowed with his theory, Oral Argument, 
2003 WL   , at 10-11.
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obvious.
There also was an obvious undercurrent in another decision that failed to analyze an 
agency decision:  some Justices disagreed with the outcome of an earlier case. In 1983, a divided 
court  found the reservation of “coal and all other minerals” in patents issued under the 1916 
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Stock-raising Homestead Act included sand and gravel.135 In Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United 
135
 Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 55-60 (1983). 
Submission draft
141
States,136 another fractured court determined that sand and gravel were not reserved to the United 
States under the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919, which reserved all “valuable 
136
 124 S.Ct. 1587 (2004).
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minerals.”137 The BLM had started the ball rolling with a trespass claim against the surface 
owners. There was, therefore, an agency decision confirmed by the Interior Board of Land 
Appeals.138 None of the opinions discuss the Department’s rationale or decision at any length. 
137
138
 See, Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1591. The case, however,  was not decided on direct appeal.
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Nor do they consider levels of deference appropriate to agency interpretations in any detail. All of 
the opinions proceeded to independent judicial statutory interpretation.
The three opinions in the case revolved around the Justices’s attitudes toward the earlier 
case, namely, Western Nuclear and its interpretation of the Stock-raising Homestead Act. The 
plurality opinion distinguished the Pittman Act from the Stockraising Homestead Act and held 
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that, under the unambiguous ordinary meaning of the term “valuable minerals,” sand and gravel 
were not included in Nevada in1919.139  The concurrence, rather than distinguishing the two 
statutes,  would have found Western Nuclear to be wrongly decided,  but would not overturn it 
139 Id., at 1593. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, with Justices O’Connor, Scalia 
and Kennedy joining.
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because of reliance issues. The justices therefore simply concurred in the judgement rather than 
extend the error to this Act, which dealt with limited land in Nevada.140
The dissenting justices, however, had less difficulty with the Western Nuclear decision. 
140 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1597 (Thomas, J. with Breyer, J. concurring in judgement).
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More importantly, they found no reason to distinguish Congress’s intent in reserving minerals in 
the two statutes and would have interpreted their breadth similarly.141 One rationale for treating 
the reservations similarly was that the agency charged with construing the Acts had consistently 
141 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J. dissenting) Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined.
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treated them in the same manner; deference was therefore due to the agency interpretation. 142
142
“The policy choice at issue in this case is surely one that should be made either by 
Congress itself or by the executive agency administering the Pittman Act. Congress’ acceptance 
of the holding in Western Nuclear for the past two decades should control our decision, and any 
residual doubt should be eliminated by the deference owed to the executive agency that has 
Submission draft
148
Beyond whether or not the Justices mention or rely on an agency pronouncement, another 
distinction between the different rulings in Bedroc is in their authors’ approaches to statutory 
consistently construed the mineral reservations in land grant statutes as including sand and 
gravel.” Id. 
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interpretation, that is, the split between textualism and intentionalism, which are two schools of 
statutory construction.143 To a textualist, the words of the statute take precedent over any 
143
 See generally, Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative 
History” of Agency Rules,” 51 Hastings L.J. 255, 264-74 (2000) and Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian 
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legislative history or other indications of intent.144 An intentionalist might also find a clear 
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 891-913 (2003) (delineating 
arguments of various commentators for differing modes of statutory interpretation).  
144
 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1, 29 (   )( Scalia J, concurring in part and 
dissenting part) ( “Congress enacts texts, not intentions.”)
Submission draft
151
meaning in a statute. However, the relevant information such a judge would consider is broader.  
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III.  Judicial Statutory Interpretation: The Textualists v. the Intentionalists
Some Justices, most notably Justices Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, fall into the 
textualist camp. Justices Stevens and Breyer, however, are the most consistent users of an 
intentionalist framework. One avenue into the sometimes stark divergence in judicial statutory 
interpretation models is to explore some “dueling quotations, ” in which Justice Stevens and Chief 
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Justice Rehnquist each seemingly quoted Chief Justice Marshall in support of their own 
interpretive model. The quotations from United States v. Fisher145 do not bear up under scrutiny 
to the weight the opinion writers put upon them,  but the divergence in the writers’ approaches to 
statutory interpretation is real.
145
 2 Cranch 358, 2 L.Ed.. 304, 6 U.S. 358 (1805).                   
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The quotations from Fisher at first glance do appear to support the interpretive mode of 
the quoting Justices. Justice Stevens’s quotation came in his concurrence in a case seeking to 
determine whether a scrivener’s error in the 1994 Bankruptcy code amendments was what made it 
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impossible for a Chapter 7 debtor’s attorney to be paid from the bankruptcy estate.146 Justice 
Stevens opined that because a leading bankruptcy treatise found the deletion of debtors’ attorneys 
from the list of those to be allowed fees out of the estate was a scrivener’s error, “we have a duty 
146
 Lame v. United States Trustee, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004).
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to examine legislative history.”147 His footnote to this comment was:  “As Chief Justice Marshall 
147
 Lame v. United States Trustee, 124 S.Ct. at 1035 (Stevens, J. concurring) Looking at 
the history, the error was brought to the attention of Congress by a group of bankruptcy attorneys 
who thought the error was not worth objecting about. Therefore, the court’s reading being more 
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stated, ‘Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing 
from which aid can be derived ...’”148 The quotation apparently is meant to bolster reliance on 
natural than that of the attorney, Justice Stevens concurred. He was joined by Justices Souter and 
Breyer.                    
148 Id., 124 S.Ct. at 1035, n.1, citing, United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 386.
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legislative history. In the actual case, however, this comment preceded Justice Marshall’s words: 
“Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction.”149 It is, therefore, less clear that Justice 
Marshall was calling for across-the-board use of extrinsic evidence. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
purported reliance on Chief Justice Marshall was even more misplaced.
149 Fisher, 6 U.S. at 386.
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In Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United States,150 Chief Justice Rehnquist read the text of the 
interpreted statute to exclude sand and gravel from the mineral reservation made pursuant to it.  
He maintained that to look at legislative history when a statute is clear would be to disaffirm 
150
 124 S.Ct. 1587 (2004).
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precedent from Chief Justice Marshall dating to1805: “Where a law is plain and unambiguous, 
whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean 
what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.”151 The 
quotation, however, is not from Justice Marshall’s opinion in the case; it is from Justice 
151 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1595, ft. 8 quoting United States v. Fisher, 6. U.S. at 399. 
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Washington, who did not participate in the case, but stated how he would have ruled if he had 
participated.152 Moreover, the quotation continues: “But if, from a view of the whole law, or from 
152
 The case concerned whether all debts to United States, even one emerging from the 
normal course of business, would have priority under the bankruptcy laws. Chief Justice Marshall 
answered the question affirmatively.  Using the language of the title of the Act, Justice 
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Washington, however,  would have disagreed with Marshall if he had participated in the case. The 
provision would not be interpreted as encompassing the defendant’s debt, but would be limited to 
bankrupts indebted to the United States who were “revenue officers or other persons accountable 
for public money.” He would find it inequitable and wrong to include a preference for all other 
debts to the federal government. United States v. Fisher, 6. U.S. at 400 (Washington, J.).
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other laws in pari materia, the evident intention is different from the literal import of the terms 
employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intention should prevail, for that in fact 
is the will of the legislature.”153 Justice Washington also states that “...if the literal expressions of 
the law would lead to absurd, unjustified, inconvenient consequences, such a construction should 
153 Id., at 399.
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be given as to avoid such consequences, if, from the whole purview of the law, and giving effect 
to the words used, it may fairly be done.”154 The opinion quoted did not limit consideration to the 
literal words of a statute, but looked at the broader setting of the words, although not necessarily 
legislative history.
154 Id., at 400.
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The faulty attribution aside, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Bedroc does pay strict heed to 
the particular words the legislature chose. He emphasized that the Pittman Act, as opposed to the 
act construed in Western Nuclear, referred to “valuable minerals,”which to Justice Rehnquist 
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meant that “Congress has textually narrowed the scope of the term,”155 foreclosing examination of 
intent:
The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [the] 
155 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1593.
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legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’  Thus, 
our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is 
unambiguous.  We think the term ‘valuable’ makes clear that Congress did not intend to 
include sand and gravel in the Pittman Act’s mineral reservation.156
156 Id.
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Justice Stevens, in the dissent, argued that the distinction in wording between the two statutes was 
not as great as it seems; the Pittman Act used the phrase “valuable mineral” only twice; there 
were six uses of just “mineral.”157 Hence, even picking words to interpret is discretionary. 
157 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1597 (Stevens, J. dissenting)
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Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist insisted that his mode of textual interpretation eschews 
discretion: “We fail to see, moreover, how a court exercises unconstrained discretion when it 
carries out its ‘sole function’ with respect to an unambiguous statute, namely, to ‘enforce it 
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170
according to its terms.’”158 This comment  responded to Justice Stevens, who had accused the 
majority of embarking on  a path of judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative. Justice Stevens 
bemoaned the failure to use legislative history as an interpretative guide: “A method of statutory 
interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the 
158 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1595, ft. 8.  Compare a Scalia quote
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judge’s own policy preferences will affect the decisional process.”159  The two justices cannot 
159 Bedroc, 124 S.Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J. dissenting). He elaborated: “In refusing to 
examine the legislative history that provides a clear answer to the question whether Congress 
intended the scope of the mineral reservations in these two statutes to be identical, the plurality 
abandons one of the most valuable tools of judicial decisionmaking. As Justice Aharon Barak of 
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agree on fundamental premises. Justice Stevens acknowledged that words are tricky and, if 
the Israel Supreme Court has explained, the ‘minimalist’ judge ‘who holds that the purpose of the 
statute may be learned only from its language’ retains greater discretion than the judge who ‘will 
seek guidance from every reliable source.’” Id., citing Judicial Discretion 62 (Y. Kaufmann trans, 
1989).
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interpreted in a vacuum, would allow for judicial policy-making. On the other hand, Justice 
Rehnquist believes that adherence to the seeming clarity of the English language avoids any 
judicial maneuvering.  Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist is not a total purist and, on occasion,  joins 
in opinions using legislative history.160 Justice Scalia, however, goes out of his way to dissociate 
160
 E.g.,    In one case opinion that he joined, Justice Breyer covered all bases as he stated 
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that “[f]or those who find legislative history useful, the House Report’s account should end the 
matter,” but continued on to examine the words of the statute and its only “plausible purpose.” F. 
Hoffman -La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004).
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himself with any and all mention of legislative history.161
161 See, e.g., Lame v. United States Trustee, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004) (Justice Scalia does not 
join Section 3 of the opinion, which examines legislative history and finds it ambiguous); Doe v. 
Chao, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 1210, n. 7 (2004) (Justice Scalia does not join text or footnote discussing 
legislative history); and F. Hoffman -La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2373 
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(2004) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“ I concur in the judgment of the Court because the language of the 
statute is readily susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides and because only that 
interpretation is consistent with the principle that statutes should be read in accord with the 
customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within their own territories.”) 
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Justice Scalia, therefore, is the purest textualist on the bench. One such example is his 
opinion in Federal Communications Commission v. NextWave Personal Communications 
This last example was not technically illustrative of Justice Scalia rejecting legislative history, but 
was an example of resistance to trying to construe a statute consistent with the act’s intent.
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Incorporated.162 The FCC had revoked NextWave’s communication licenses for failure to make 
162
 537 U.S. 293 (2003). NextWave purchased licenses for personal communications 
services through auctions. It was to pay pursuant to an installment contract, but it initiated a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The FCC claimed that the licenses were terminated pursuant to their 
terms for failure to make payments.
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payments after NextWave entered bankruptcy. Justice Scalia looked to the statute forbidding 
certain governmental revocations: “[A] governmental unit may not... revoke . . . a license ... to ... 
a person that is ... a debtor under this title . . . solely because such debtor . . . has not paid a debt 
that is dischargeable under this title. . . .” 163 He concluded that because the statute does not have 
163 NextWave, 537 U.S. at 300 (summarizing Bankruptcy Code § 525(a).
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an exception for revocations for valid regulatory purposes, even if that might have been 
preferable, the FCC’s motive in revoking the license was not material.  Justice Scalia then 
defended his insistence on simply looking at the text of the statute for four pages of the 
opinion.164 Justice Breyer carried the intentionalist banner in the case.165
164 Id., at 304-08.
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165
 Justice Stevens concurred in the case, but not for the Justice Scalia’s textualist 
reasoning: “In sum, even though I agree with Justice Breyer’s view that the literal text of a statute 
is not always a sufficient basis for determining the actual intent of Congress, in these cases I 
believe it does produce the correct answer.”  NextWave, 537 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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Justice Breyer warned that strict textualism could lead to error if the literal wording of a 
statute is considered apart from the purpose of the statute. Linguistics caution against such an 
approach:
General terms as used on particular occasions often carry with them implied restrictions as 
to scope. ‘Tell all customers that ...’ does not refer to every customer of every business in 
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183
the world. That is also so for a legal reason. Law as expressed in statutes seeks to regulate 
human activities in particular ways. Law is tied to life. And a failure to understand how a 
statutory rule is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to 
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184
benefit. ‘No vehicles in the park’ does not refer to baby strollers or even to tanks used as 
part of a war memorial.166
166 NextWave, 537 U.S. at 311 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Fuller, Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 663 (1958)). See also, Id. at 
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To Justice Breyer, the purpose of the statute could be derived from its title, language, and its 
317, where Justice Breyer further invokes the absurdity doctrine, if not by name. 
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history. This purpose was to protect debtors from discrimination against them simply because 
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they have become bankrupt and to allow them to get a “fresh start,” not to prevent the government 
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from securing a security interest in a license.167 Although the purpose-driven interpretation did 
167 Id., at 313. 
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not command a majority in NextWave, on the same day that NextWave was decided, a second case 
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was handed down in which the  purpose of the statute governed the interpretation of it.168
168
 The two cases were decided on January 15, 2003.  Furthering the coincidence, both 
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were argued on October 8, 2002.
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In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,169 the intentionalists were in the majority. The Coal 
169
  537 U.S. 149 (2003).
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Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 included a provision that the Commissioner of Social 
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Security “shall, before October 1, 1993" assign coal industry retirees to an existing operator or 
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other entity pursuant to a statutory preference system.170 Each company would pay premiums for 
170 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a).
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assigned retirees. Unassigned retirees (and their survivors) would have benefits funded out of 
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specified funds, the expense of which would be partially born by companies in proportion to the 
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number of retirees assigned to them.  In the case, a company objected to the validity of an initial 
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assignment of a retiree  that was made after October 1, 1993.171
171 Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 152. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
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Justice Souter, for the majority, found the assignment valid despite its tardiness. When 
Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
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Congress was not clear on stating what was the impact of failing to meet a deadline, the court 
would not infer that authority would terminate:
 [A] statute directing official action needs more than a mandatory “shall” before the grant 
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of power can sensibly be read to expire when the job is supposed to be done. Nothing so 
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limiting, however, is to be found in the Coal Act: no express language supports the 
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companies, while structure, purpose and legislative history go against them.172
172 Id., at 161. See also, F. Hoffman -La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 
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2372 (2004), where Justice Breyer acknowledges that the plaintiffs might have the  “most natural”  
linguistic argument, but then rejects it: “At most, respondents’ linguistic arguments might show 
that respondents’ reading is the more natural reading of the statutory language. But those 
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arguments do not show that we must accept that reading. And that is the critical point. The 
considerations previously mentioned - those of comity and history - make clear that the 
respondents’ reading is not consistent with the FTAIA’s basic intent. If the statute’s language 
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reasonably permits an interpretation consistent with that intent, we should adopt it.”
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The objective was to assign as many retirees as possible to a responsible operator; if the date for 
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action was jurisdictional, rather than a spur to action, the Commission would end up assigning a 
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smaller amount of retirees.173
173 Id.,  at 171.
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To Justice Scalia, however, there was no easy read of Congress’s objectives; the Act was 
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riddled with compromise and lengthy debate.174 Therefore, faithful adherence to the text is in 
174 Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. at 183 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justices O’Connor and 
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Thomas joined the dissent. Justice Thomas separately dissented to emphasize that judges must 
construe statutes in accord with their “ordinary and natural meaning;” “shall” means a mandatory 
requirement. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. at 184 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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order:175 “When an agency exercises a power that so tests constitutional limits, we have all the 
175 Id., at 174.
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more obligation to assure that it is rooted in the text of a statute. . . . When a power is conferred 
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for a limited time the automatic consequence of the expiration of that t ime is the expiration of the 
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power”176 Additionally, other provisions of the Coal Act would be “rendered incoherent” if this 
176 Id., at 174-175.  He argues that the assignment power could violate the Constitution if 
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it imposes severe retroactive liability on some coal companies, citing Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). To Justice Scalia, this increases the need to strictly construe the 
statute.
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reading was not adopted.177  The majority, however, found the textual maneuvering ungraceful: 
177 Id., at 179.
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“There is a basic lesson to be learned from Justice Scalia’s contortions to avoid the untoward 
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results flowing from his formalistic theory that time limits on mandatory official action are 
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always jurisdictional when they occur in an authorizing provision. The lesson is that something is 
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very wrong with the theory.”178 The textualist justice was accused of a formal rigidity that lost 
178 Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. at 162, ft.8
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sight of the larger picture.
In other instances, however, Justice Scalia gathered colleagues to the textualist fold. In 
Submission draft
225
Barnhart v. Thomas,179Justice Scalia, for a unanimous Court, decided that the Social Security 
179
  540 U.S. 20 (2003).
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Administration, without additional inquiry, could classify a person as not disabled, and thus 
ineligible for Supplemental Security Income,  if the person could still do her previous work, even 
if such work no longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The worker in 
question had been an elevator operator, and the relevant statute defined disability in material part 
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as follows:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his 
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previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in 
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any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.180
180
 42 U.S. C. § 423 (d)(2)(A) as quoted in Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 379 (emphasis by Justice 
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The Third Circuit had applied the modifying “which exists in the national economy” to both “any 
Scalia).
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other kind of substantial gainful work” and  “previous work.”181 Justice Scalia cited rules of 
181
 Thomas v. Apfel, 294 F.3d 568, 572 (2002).
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grammar that would counter this and require the modifier to only attach to the latter situation.182
182 Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 380-81.
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He also provided the example of whether a parent would tolerate a child claiming immunity if a 
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party the child threw did not damage the family home when the son was told, before his parents 
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left for a weekend: “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that 
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damages the house.”183  To Justice Scalia, the parents clearly were prescribing two activities, 
183 Id., at 381.
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namely, no parties and no damage to the home, and the proscriptions were potentially motivated 
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by different concerns.184
184 Id.
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The remaining Justices, however, did not have to totally subscribe to Justice Scalia’s 
textualist explication. The Social Security Administration regulations clearly held that a person 
who could still perform his or her previous employment would not be considered disabled, 
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without regard to whether such jobs remained available. The opinion held that Chevron required 
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deference if the statute did not “unambiguously require a different interpretation” and the SSA’s 
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interpretation was “reasonable.”185 Justice Scalia did not decide whether the statute “compels the 
185
  “The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give rise to 
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undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), but rather whether, in light 
of the alternatives, the agency construction is reasonable.” Id., at 382.
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interpretation given it by the SSA.”186 Therefore, Justice Scalia provided more than one rationale 
186 Id.
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in his opinion.
Justice Scalia’s inclination to give an agency interpretation dispositive weight revealed 
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itself again  in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, this time in dissent.187 Justice 
187
 General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 249 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
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dissenting) (deferring  to the agency entrusted with interpretation of the statute because it “is 
neither foreclosed by the statute nor unreasonable.”)
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Scalia objected to the majority’s opinion,188  which relied on both legislative history and “social 
188
 124 S.Ct. 1236 (2004). The opinion was written by Justice Souter and joined by Chief 
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Scalia also did 
not directly join Justice Thomas’s dissent, arguably because Justice Thomas felt it was wrong for 
the majority to ignore the comments by Senator Yarborough in the Act’s legislative history. 
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General Dynamics, 124 S.Ct at 1252 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
Submission draft
251
history.”189 Justice Souter held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission erred in 
189 General Dynamics, 124 S.Ct at 1246. In a dissent, which Justice Scalia referenced, 
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Justice Thomas noted that “social history” was an undefined term and maintained that to rely on it 
was an “unprecedented step.” General Dynamics, 124 S.Ct at 1252 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
Despite the linguistic coincidence, it is possible that the importation of social history into 
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statutory interpretation reflects a third mode,  namely “dynamic interpretation.” Proponents of 
such a method urge that judges may “update” statutes by interpreting them not only in light of 
intentions and purpose when passed, but also in view of current needs, social trends, and beliefs. 
Submission draft
254
See, e.g. G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982) (arguing that judges could 
invalidate outdated statutes as they interpret them dynamically);  Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987) (statutory interpretation should not be limited to 
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finding that the Equal Employment Act protected workers who were over forty from actions that 
text and historical context, but should also consider present societal, political, and legal context).
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benefitted those over fify.190 The majority found such action did  not  “discriminate ... with 
190 General Dynamics, 124 S.Ct at   . General Dynamics and the United Auto Workers in 
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1997 had modified their contract, essentially deleting the requirement to give medical benefits to 
future retirees, unless the workers were at least fifty years old in 1997.  The Equal Employment 
Act protects workers forty and above. The relatively younger - but still protected class - were thus 
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arguing that they were being denied benefits that those older were receiving. 
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respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of age.”191
191
 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1).
Submission draft
260
Despite an agency regulation to the contrary,192 the court used the “context” of the statute to limit 
192
 29 CFR 1625.2(a) (2003) (“[I] f two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 
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the Act’s scope:
and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but 
must make such decision on the basis of some other factor”).
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[P] refatory provisions and their legislative history make a case that we think is beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the ADEA was concerned to protect a relatively old worker from 
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discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively young.193
193 General Dynamics, 124 S.Ct. at 1243. See also, Id. at 1240: 
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In the abstract, the phrase [because of age]  is open to an argument for a broader 
construction, since reference to “age” carries no express modifier and the word 
could be read to look two ways. This more expansive possible understanding does 
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not, however, square with the natural reading of the whole provision prohibiting 
discrimination, and in fact Congress’s interpretive clues speak almost unanimously 
to an understanding of discrimination as directed against workers who are older 
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than the ones getting treated better.
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As Justice Souter noted, there were two possible meanings of age194 and Congress used the “term 
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in a commonly understood, narrow sense (‘age’ as ‘relatively old age’).”195 A judge who looks at  
Congressional intent, therefore, is not caged into one dictionary meaning of a word, even when 
looking at the use of a word more than once in one statute. The presumption that a word means the 
same thing in different parts of a statute is not rigid, but yields to the “cardinal rule, ” namely that 
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statutory language must be read in context.196
To a textualist, legislative history is of less importance, primarily because the statements 
contained in reports are not enacted into legislation and legislators may not have been read 
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reports.197 Additionally, because Congress is a collective body, it cannot have any true “intent” 
behind its actions; with “logrolling” and compromises, many different rationales may color an 
individual legislator’s vote and hence make it impossible to come up with one true Congressional 
“intent.”198 Therefore, if a textualist needs to “interpret” a statute to get to its “clear meaning,” the 
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judge will often employ dictionaries and lay definitions of words.199 Also of import would be 
judicial canons of construction.200 The use of particular words have particular meanings.201
The multitude of interpretive devises allow Justices to pick and choose rationales that 
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comport with their judicial temperament and, more cynically, with their substantive predilection. 
Although Chevron’s demand for deference always could be circumvented by finding a “clear 
meaning” of a statute,202 the resurrection of a second level of agency deference can increase the 
judicial tendency to exercise discretion. The first act of discretion is choosing the justice’s 
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preferred mode, be it intentionalism or textualism. 
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IV. Agency Statutory Interpretation: A “Canon” in the “Text” of Judicial Activism
The term “canon” refers to a rule or principle, and also could be viewed as a shorthand for 
“canons of construction.”203  The relationship of the Chevron doctrine to these principles of 
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statutory construction has evolved. At one point, the Chevron doctrine placed the primary 
responsibility for interpreting an ambiguous law on the administering agency, based on a theory of 
delegation and separation of powers. The agency, rather than the court, arbitrated the policy choice 
within the bounds Congress set down.204 Therefore, Chevron’s dictate was not an optional 
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construction aid  for the courts, but a firm dictate.205  The Chevron doctrine required deference to 
the agency if a statute was ambiguous. In essence, the agency’s interpretation of the statute would 
then govern.With the impact of Mead and Christensen working their way into the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, to consider or not to consider an agency’s statutory construction is much more a 
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judicial choice. The actual agency opinion, rather than providing a decisional framework, may now 
be used as a mere canon of construction: an aid to judicial interpretation that can be used or 
discarded pursuant to a judge’s inclination. This differs from past explicit rationales to ignore an 
agency pronouncement.
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A. Extraordinary Circumstances and Other Avoidance Mechanisms
In the past, the Supreme Court has explicitly ignored an agency opinion in “extraordinary 
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situations, ” arguing that such situations negate the underlying rationale of Chevron: Congress 
would not have “implicitly” delegated to the agency the authority to decide such an issue.206
Similarly, the “significance” of an issue, such as whether the EPA could consider costs in one 
aspect of the Clean Air Act, tended to negate a conclusion that Congress left it unaddressed and 
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therefore, through ambiguity,  delegated the question to the agency. Eight justices joined this 
decision.207 Despite this case’s near unanimity, however, defining what situations are 
“extraordinary” is debatable and cases have not always been unanimous in finding this prerequisite 
to negating implied delegation.  In one case,  five Justices found “economical and political” 
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ramifications could trigger the exception from Chevron.208  This justified the holding that the Food 
and Drug Administration could not assert jurisdiction over tobacco without an express 
delegation.209   The dissent, however, doubted that a “background canon of interpretation” existed 
that required issues of “enormous social consequences” to be “made by Members of Congress 
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rather than by unelected agency administrators.”210 Even if the canon existed, those in the dissent 
would not have applied it in the particular instance, emphasizing that the President and Vice-
President are the only officials the entire nation elects.211 Therefore, the executive branch could 
appropriately make this decision. 
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In addition to this purported canon displacing delegation to an agency, the Court has 
expressly used some other canons to avoid looking at agency interpretations. The Solid Waste212
case is a good example. At issue was a Corp of Engineers regulation that asserted jurisdiction over 
Submission draft
285
wetlands that were used by migratory birds. Justice Rehnquist used the canon that agencies cannot 
construe statutes in a way that raises serious constitutional questions unless Congress gave a clear 
direction.213  This interpretative mode employs the “avoidance canon.”214  In this situation, a court 
does not determine whether a regulation under a statute violates constitutional norms, but 
Submission draft
286
delineates the reasons why the regulation raises constitutional concerns.
A case challenging the 1990 census results, under which Utah lost one representative and 
North Carolina gained one, provides particular insight on how this purported canon works.  The 
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Census Bureau used “hot-deck imputation” to fill in gaps about how many people lived in a 
dwelling unit after all other attempts to determine size failed.215 The Constitution talks of an 
“actual enumeration” of population and the statute governing the apportionment of representatives 
prohibits the “statistical method known as ‘sampling.’”216 The case therefore had two prongs: 
Submission draft
288
whether the Bureau could use  the method under the statute and whether the method could be part 
of a constitutional result. Most of the Justices found the practice conformed with both the statute 
and the constitution.217 Justice O’Connor concurred  on the constitutional issue, but dissented and 
would rule that imputation is actually sampling, which the statute prohibited. She would not read 
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the prohibition on “sampling” narrowly, even if the Bureau had done so:
The majority also notes the possibility of Chevron deference with respect to the term 
‘sampling.’ But the majority ultimately does not rely on this form of deference, nor does it 
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indicate where the Bureau has provided an interpretation of § 195 that would have the force 
of ‘law’ on this issue ... Additionally, based on Justice Thomas’s partial dissent, I would 
find that the Bureau’s use of imputation to calculate state population for apportionment 
purposes at least raises a difficult constitutional issue. This provides a basis to construe § 
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195 as precluding imputation, regardless of whether the Bureau is entitled to any form of 
deference.218
Justice O’Connor is truly “avoiding” deferring to agency regulations if they simply raise 
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constitutional issues; she would substantively disagree and find no Constitutional violation, but 
would not defer to the agency because two other Justices found a violation of the Constitution. 
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B. Agency Interpretation Relegated to Canon Status
What has occurred with the advent of Mead and Christensen, however, goes beyond the 
express use of canons to avoid agency interpretations. The ultimate result is different: the agency 
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interpretation is itself a “canon” of interpretation. The substantive conclusion that the agency has 
made about the meaning of the statute may be used as an aid to clarify the meaning of a statute, 
just as the doctrine of ejusdem generis or any other interpretive tool may be employed. And, like 
other statutory canons, to use or not use them is up to the judges.219 Canon employment is perhaps 
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of more import to textualists than intentionalists, due to their position that legislators are cognizant 
of them and draft with canons in mind.
An example of this byplay is in Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Company.220 The Coal Industry 
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Retirement Health Benefit Act only directly lists two ways in which a company’s percentage 
liability for unassigned beneficiaries would be modified.221 To Justice Scalia, the question of 
whether the listing of two exceptions excludes any other way of modifying the percentage was not 
crucial; he found that there was no authority granted to the agency to make late assignments of 
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responsibility to companies.222 Nevertheless, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, took pains to 
explain that the  canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply:
[T]he canon ...does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when 
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the items expressed are members of an "associated group or series," justifying the inference 
that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.223
 Justice Scalia responded viscerally:  “The most enduring consequence of today’s opinion may 
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well be its gutting of the ancient canon of construction.”224 Referring to the Court’s comment that 
there could be an unprovided for case rather than an excluded exception “unless there is reason to 
think the third was at least considered,” he responded: “This is an unheard-of limitation upon the 
accepted principle of construction inclusio unius, exclusio alterious.  It is also an absurd limitation, 
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since it means that the more unimaginable an unlisted item is, the more likely it is not to be 
excluded.”225 Canons of construction, when tied to textual interpretations, are more cherished by a 
textualist.226
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Nevertheless, because canons of construction guide rather than bind judges, 227 the 
existence of an agency interpretation would not require deference from a court if such an 
interpretation is simply another canon to be used in statutory interpretation. The meaning that an 
agency supplies for a statute  would be used or not used by the judge in the same manner other aids 
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to interpretation are used.
V. Conclusion
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With Mead and Christensen increasing the flexibility in regard to agency interpretations, 
the divide between  Justices who follow the a textualist bend and those who follow an 
intentionalist mode of statutory interpretation simply grows more vivid. There is, however, some 
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correlation between at least nominal respect for agency pronouncements and interpretive stance. 
Justice Scalia, the strict textualist, was the most irate Justice about the purported Mead
change  to Chevron: to him, deference to “authoritative” agency pronouncements was at least a 
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verbal article of faith, even if regularly disregarded in practice.228  This comports with positioning 
the legislature  above the judiciary in policy-making because the Chevron principle theoretically 
derives from Congressional delegation of authority to agencies and hence away from the courts.229
Textualists, in addition to expressing a desire for bright rules on when to defer to agencies, also are 
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more open to rules of construction. Rules, and their concomitant predictability, are more valued to 
reign in judges, who to Justice Scalia are the least democratic of branches.230 Judges also are 
institutionally less able to freely garner information, viewpoints, and expertise than either agencies 
or legislatures.231 Therefore, judges should not be looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” 
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which Justice Scalia has called  “that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules 
(and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ test.”232
Submission draft
308
 Intentionalists, however, are much more comfortable with judges making such judgment 
calls from all available evidence.233 In fact, to not  look at all possible indications of Congressional 
intent would be to allow a judge’s discretion to run  unchecked; language without context can be 
made to fit almost any interpretation. As Justice Stevens phrased it: “A method of statutory 
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interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the 
judge’s own policy preferences will affect the decisional process.” 234
The end result of the change from Chevron being the sole guide to review of agency 
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statutory interpretation is that,  more vividly than before, the Justices’ theories of statutory 
interpretation governs their statutory interpretation. Justices fall into textualist and intentionalist 
camps. Even within these divisions, however, interpretations can be outcome-based because there 
is the “fallback” of being able to use the various deference provisions if they suited the Justice’s  
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desired interpretation. Both the Justices conventionally-labeled “conservative” and those labeled 
“liberal” are activists. In telling what the law is, judges can and do create law. 
